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Critical Corpse Studies
Engaging with Corporeality
and Mortality in Curriculum
Abstract
 This article focuses on the pedagogical questions we might consider when 
teaching with and about corpses. Whereas much recent posthumanist writing in 
educational research takes up the Deleuzian question “what can a body do?,” this 
article investigates what a dead body can do for students’ encounters with life and 
death across the curriculum. The article calls attention to how a corpse’s pedagogical 
force functions as as a kind of curricular text. The authors present four different 
types of curricular encounters with corpses: curricular encounters of disgust, cur-
ricular encounters with denial, curricular encounters with dis/re-membering, and 
curricular encounters with disruption. educators to imagine how they might engage 
with corpses and corporeal through an enhanced sense of mortality in helpful 
ways. The authors suggest that a worthy curricular aim is not to simply de-center 
the valorization of life as a triumphant finish and logical conclusion but instead to 
teach how life in a larger, more exciting and terrifying complexity, continues into 
and beyond death.
On Death’s Door: An Introduction
 What might emerge from rethinking human bodies, particularly in terms of 
how they function beyond our mortal coil? Although humans are prone to squish-
ing down and defending against affective and emotional reactions to the subject of 
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mortality, persevering in these initially troubling reactions provides an opportunity 
for different relations with each other as well as other entities on this planet (as well as 
the planet itself). This posthuman perspective suggests death “is not the teleological 
destination of life, a sort of ontological magnet that propels us forward” (Braidotti, 
2013, p. 133), and the figure of the corpse thrust the concept of human into this onto-
logical opportunity. Wallin (2016) indicates this when he suggests curriculum studies 
must respond to a “thanatonic scene,” a scene in which curriculum thought must be 
rested away from moribund, deadening apparatuses of school, technical rationalism, 
standardization, and other deadly dull devices of control and governmentality. Wallin 
(2013) tracks this other possible ‘life’ of curriculum in his concept of deadagogy, 
that considers death’s potential for resistance, experimentation, revolt(ing) protest, 
and other educative commitments. Inspired by this notion of dedagogy, we explore 
in this article what curriculum studies can learn from dead bodies—the figure of the 
corpse—in our present intellectual moment when curriculum theorists are thinking 
with and through the posthuman (Gough, 2004; Lewis & Kahn, 2010; Snaza & 
Weaver, 2014; Zembylas, 2018), transhuman (Bradley, 2018), inhuman (Springgay 
& Truman, 2017; Truman, 2019), and more-than-human (Schulte, 2019).
 Before we proceed further, we should note that in this article we discuss in frank 
and vivid ways the affects and effects of corpses and related aspects of death, dying, 
and decay. Following how Haraway (2016) encourages us to stay with the trouble of 
“living and dying together on a damaged earth” (p. 143), we also encourage readers 
to stay with us in these arguments. However, we acknowledge how the affects and 
effects of death, corpses, and corporeality have the potential to elicit trauma and 
traumatic intensities and wish to caution readers of the contents of our article as 
having the capacity to overwhelm, disturb, and trouble beyond the reader’s desire 
for such intensities. 
 The editors of this special issue highlight affects and effects of waste by asking 
curriculum scholars to consider “the rejected, the dross, the chucked, and/or the 
useless.” We find these affects of waste in certain humanist notions of bodies and 
corpses. First, humans reject corpses and want nothing to do with them. A person 
cannot eat, fuck, or love a corpse, as a curriculum history of the corpse would attest. 
Recall history teaching us the taboos of cannibalism in the Donner Party (Brown, 
2009; Wallis, 2017) and the taboos of necrophilia, as in the renewed cultural interest 
in Jeffrey Dahmer (Backderf, 2012; Meyers, 2017). Secondly, as Schwartz (2015) 
instructs us, we often think of corpses as useless because, as lifeless bodies, they 
no longer appear to possess agency and subjectivity, becoming husks or shells once 
life ends. Taking this further, Kristeva (1980/1982) suggests a corpse is “that thing 
that no longer matches and therefore no longer signifies anything” (p. 4). To be sure, 
neither Schwartz (2015) nor Kristeva (1980/1982) are suggesting here that corpses 
are useless, but we take their claims as our starting point to reject humanist ideas 
that corpses are useless and must be jettisoned from conversation, polite talk, talk 
at school and in the home.
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 Pushing back on this situation, we seek to illustrate in this article all that a 
corpse has to teach us about mortality through corporeality. Sonu and Snaza (2015) 
call our attention in how “to educate in ways that attune to the human as entangled 
with the more-than-human without hypostasising “the human” as if it were separate 
or separable” (p. 262). Following their call, we demonstrate in this article how we 
can thrust ourselves into a species-level humility needed as climate catastrophe 
looms along with its associated hardships on every entity on the planet. We can 
position education away from a denial of death and towards de-escalating harmful 
social and environmental processes without privileging educators (or any human) 
as savior (van Kessel, 2018, 2019). 
 To do so, through several examples of how corpses render death educatively 
as a reminder of life, we discuss how educators might read the corpse as a site of 
curriculum for death through four curricular modes: disgust, denial, dis-membering, 
and disruption. First, we provide some theoretical considerations for death, mor-
tality, and corporeality in curriculum thought, examining which bodies are present 
in curriculum as we dig down into the curriculum of the corpse itself. Next, we 
examine the fluids that ooze out of bodies and corpses that engage us educationally 
as a curricular mode of disgust. Following this, we probe the logic of mortality 
through a curricular mode of denial emerging in human encounters with corpses 
and the corporeal. Third, we describe possibilities of communing with the dead 
that emerge in a curricular mode of dis-membering with corpses, attending to what 
the corpse dis-members and allows the living to re-member through attachments 
with and of the corpse. Fourth, once learners move through disgust, denial, and 
dis-membering, they must contend with corporeality and mortality as a curriculum 
of affirmative disruption that serves to (positively) disrupt the humanist boundaries 
of a corpse. Finally, we conclude our article with a call for educators to imagine 
how they might engage with corpses and corporeal through an enhanced sense of 
mortality in helpful ways. Our aim throughout the act of curriculum theorizing on 
offer in our article is not simply to de-center the valorization of life as a triumphant 
finish and logical conclusion but to teach how life in a larger, more exciting and 
terrifying complexity, continues into and beyond death. 
Framing the Corpse as a Site of Curriculum:
Theoretical Considerations
 The starting point for our argument is that there are many forms of human 
bodies normalized in curriculum: abled bodies; highly functioning and successful 
bodies; the glorified bodies of heroes and leaders (who even in death are “still with 
us” in history); and the valorization of life in biology (with a focus on life and how 
life begins, evolves, unfolds). Brooks (1993) accounts for these different kinds of 
bodies as “heroic, sacred, suffering, tragic… pornographic, even moribund” (p. 5). 
All of these bodies that champion life as the triumphant outcome and reward for 
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merely existing as human crash face a limit when we think about the forms of life 
minimized, excluded, and avoided in curriculum. However, as Brooks goes on to 
claim, “the primacy of the body is most dramatically felt in its failure,” its death 
and destruction (p. 5). These bodies serve as “a site of signification—the place for 
an inscription of stories—and itself a signifier, a prime agent in narrative plot and 
meaning” (Brooks, 1993, pp. 5-6). Thus, the humanist notion of a body breaks 
down when we think of the body as a corpse. 
 While a corpse is still a body, it functions differently in that it dissolves the self, 
complicating what some may take for granted as “the tendential connectivity of the 
living and the dead” (Locke, 2016, p. 72). The binary opposition of the living and 
the dead constrains what we think a body can do. Curriculum theory “wastes” many 
potential sites and scenarios for exploration, investigation, meditation, introspection, 
examination, and rumination on boundaries and passages of life and death when 
we set up rigid dichotomies that privilege states of being alive over being dead, 
or, as some curriculum scholars demonstrate, being undead in curriculum thought 
(Black, Gray, & Leahy, 2016; Flinders, 2016; Huddleston, 2016; Urmacher, 2014).
 When curriculum studies scholars choose to prioritize the liberal humanist 
subject of life, living, and the human, it presents the humanist subject as a living 
body, in a way that Edwards (2018) describes as “an exceptional entity who exists 
apart from a world of animals and things and whose fate can be directed by the 
rationalist will” (p. 5). In this set-up, death and dying are excluded and rendered 
as a binary opposite of the human subject. When you are no longer human you are 
dead, inside and otherwise. Working against this limited perspective, we argue for 
productive educational engagements with death that engage with a species humility 
informed, in part, by Ernest Becker (1973, 1975) and Eugene Thacker (2011, 2015a, 
2015b). These engagements help us embrace our fluid nature in death and life, 
providing a way to affirmatively examine our lives. In this way, a corpse (although 
frequently considered to be non-agentic, having ‘wasted’-away) is at the heart of 
what might be considered educational. This affirmative examination of the corpse 
maps on to how Braidotti (2013) thinks about death as:
a creative synthesis of flows, energies and perpetual becoming…. The full blast 
of the awareness of the transitory nature of all that lives is the defining moment 
in our existence. It structures our becoming-subjects, our capacity and powers of 
relation and the process of acquiring ethical awareness. (pp. 131-132)
Part of this ethical awareness involves effecting a posthumanist change in the body’s 
status from subject to object and decentering what we see as a subject, such as the 
sacred position living human bodies occupy in curriculum studies. One example of 
this awareness is in what Alaimo (2010, 2018) calls trans-corporeality, by which she 
means “that all creatures, as embodied beings, are intermeshed with the dynamic, 
material world, which crosses through them, transforms them, and is transformed 
by them” (2018, p. 435). This concept inspires the aim of our article in moving 
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curriculum thought away from the human as a “master subject of Western humanist 
individualism, who imagines himself as transcendent, disembodied and removed 
from the world he surveys” (Alaimo, 2018, p. 436). Replacing a view that chiefly 
considers how to improve and perfect the man-as-human-master, a view that fore-
ground mortality and corporeality affirms death along with “the strange agencies 
that interconnect substance, flesh and place” (Alaimo, 2018, p. 436). In the sections 
that follow, we provide several examples to illustrate how curriculum studies can 
position corpses as interconnected objects that never remove the learner-as-human 
from the scene of thinking, but, rather, re-positions the learner-as-human as a less 
forceful and powerful force, one actant of many actants in the world.
 But the human(ist) relationship to death is a fraught one and moving quickly 
towards a kind of trans-corporeality that Alaimo and other posthumanist scholars call 
for is not necessarily an easy move to make. This is because of a deeply human(ist) 
aversion to facing death, a denial of death we discuss in detail in section three of this 
article. This denial works on multiple levels. Derrida (1993) gestures towards this 
denial when he points out that “[f]or us, in the West, within our borders, death would 
be, and increasingly so, almost prohibited, dissimulated, disposed of, and denied” 
stemming from a “certain incapacity to look death in the face” (p. 57-58). Agreeing 
with Derrida, we wonder about why education, and curriculum in particular, supports 
such deep incapacities to look death in the face and confront it, read about it, think 
about it, talk about it, feel about it, and write about it when, in our present moment, 
death is inescapable within spaces of learning, from school shootings to youth suicide, 
from pep rallies for students with cancer to the drudgery and normalization of death 
when dissecting specimens of dead animals in a school biology lab. 
 Thus, a more affirmative and productive engagement with death is necessary 
to achieve a level of thought in which the human body becomes not a marker, but 
a conduit. We find that within curriculum theory and curriculum studies death has 
not often been a prominent conceptual concern of the field. Both Britzman (2002) 
and Snaza (2014) have in their own ways wrestled with issues of ghosts, spectrality, 
haunting, and death as structuring forces of curriculum studies through provocative 
and compelling engagements with death and curriculum. We, the authors of this 
article, follow these and other curriculum scholars in examining issues of death, 
corpses, and the corporeal, a collaborative project we are engaged in with colleagues 
in an ongoing project of death in social studies education. In the four sections to 
which we now turn, we cast our focus close to the corpse and its association with 
death as we consider how death, dying, and creaturely features of the corpse such 
as fluids and remains can alter foundational questions of curriculum. We agree 
with Wallin (2016) in asserting that “curriculum shares with ethics the fundamen-
tal question of how to live, or rather, how a life might go” (p. 39) and we take this 
questioning to the grave, so to speak, in considering how a life goes on after death 
and through the corpse.
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Corporeality and Mortality as a Curriculum of Disgust 
 A critical study of corpses must first attend to that which corpses are most 
often considered to do—revile and disgust—which is a common human reaction 
to the complex processes of transformation bodies undergo upon death rendering 
them into corpses. One aspect of the corpse associated with disgust is the process of 
decomposition a body undergoes immediately upon death. The decomposition of a 
body as it transforms into a corpse is a long process that occurs through sequential 
stages of pallor mortis (soon after death as the body becomes pale and discolored 
due to the loss of blood circulation); algor mortis (when the body becomes cold to 
the touch once an internal temperature can no longer be regulated); rigor mortis 
(when the body stiffens and tenses due to cellular changes in muscle tissue); livor 
mortis (when blood settles and pools in the lower portion of the body from gravity 
when blood flow stops). This process is followed by putrefaction and decomposition 
(when the corpse turns green from gases filling the body and compounds such as 
cadaverine and putrescine are released into the corpse) that then leads to final stag-
es of skeletonization and fossilization of the corpse (Cohut, 2018; Suazo, 2017). 
Central to this accounting for the body’s becoming-corpse is the nature of fluids 
with(in) a corpse, such as blood, pus, dissolved membranes, slime, and embalming 
fluids. These fluids circulate around and within the corpse as a site of curriculum 
through their affective intensity. In this section, we discuss how one aspect of the 
corpse as a site of curriculum is in how we respond to bodily fluids, often seen in 
discharges and viscera, in forceful ways.
 Our precognitive reaction is likely linked to our uneasiness about our crea-
tureliness and associated mortality: “Mortality is connected to the natural, animal 
side of his existence; and so man reaches beyond and away from that side. So much 
that he tries to deny it completely” (Becker, 1975, p. 92). Our visceral reaction to 
bodily fluids, in part, stems from its reminder of our animality and thus our status 
as finite creatures. As Kristeva (1980/1982) noted,
The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, to fall), that which has irremediably come a crop-
per, is cesspool, and death; it upsets even more violently the one who confronts 
it as fragile and fallacious chance. A wound with blood and pus, or the sickly, 
acrid smell of sweat, of decay, does not signify death… corpses show me what I 
permanently thrust aside in order to live. (p. 3)
This reaction to seeing a corpse is, upon Kristeva’s description of it, an unpleasant 
reaction, one that “upsets” in her words. While we would suggest not all encounters 
with a corpse are de facto unpleasant encounters, we agree with Kristeva that when 
we encounter a corpse much of our humanist learning sputters out of control. We fill 
up with irrational thoughts, feelings, and affects: How could this be? What happened 
to this body? What circumstances have brought me into contact with this corpse? 
Seeing (and smelling, feeling, sensing) the corpse may cause us to cry, tear up, 
retch, race our heart rate, make our breathing heavy, turn knots in our stomach, or 
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even laugh—especially that kind of spasmodic, inappropriate laughter out of dis-
comfort associated with encounters of the grotesque (Edwards & Graulund, 2013). 
 (Over)reactions that serve to deny our fluid (and mortal) nature are embodied 
in the example of how followers of the Greek god Dionysos (or “Bacchus” to the 
Romans) were treated. Dionysos, was a god of fluids—not only wine and honey 
(bee vomit!), but also (as a fertility god) semen, vaginal arousal fluid, breastmilk, 
and so on. Plutarch comments upon the god as not tied to nature (physis), but 
specifically to fluid nature (hygra physis):
Clearly, what Plutarch has in mind by this phrase are all of the flowering, dripping, 
throbbing, sluicing, gurgling forms which the force of life takes in nature, as water, 
milk, semen, blood, amniotic fluid, honey, saliva, sap, and the special gift from 
Dionysos himself, wine. (Meagher, 1995, p. 72)
Although ancient Greek culture is a shadow of its former self—at times even 
confined to cartoon form—it is an important reminder that Dionysos was not just 
a god of sex, drugs, and rock ‘n roll, but rather keenly linked to bodily fluids and 
death. Dionysos (in the Orphic tradition) was killed and dismembered by the Titans, 
then resurrected—akin to Orpheus travelling to Hades and returning. Dionysos was 
linked to death, and ancient Greek society saw death as unclean: “those affected 
[by death] are impure and are excluded for a certain amount of time from normal 
life” (Burkert, 1985, p. 79). The followers of Dionysos were also excluded by the 
dominant culture—perhaps due to his connections with the mortal bodies and their 
fluids. By the second century BCE, the Bacchanalian mysteries had come under 
scrutiny by the government and eventually outlawed. The Roman historian Livy 
(1970) noted that the Bacchic cult is not part of “authentic” Roman religion; for 
example, the cult is called a prava religio and is counted among dangerous foreign 
religions (39.16.6-10). The followers of Bacchus were “a people apart, on the fringe 
of the Populus Romanus, like the Christian church later on: a separatism that was 
heavy with menace” (Turcan, 1997, p. 303), and the visible presence of women was 
explained by the Roman historian Livy as due to their susceptibility “to religious 
frenzy” (Edwards, 1993, p. 44). In 186 BCE, nocturnal meetings and fires were 
banned, and access in and out of Rome was strictly monitored, and those involved 
in the cult of Bacchus were interrogated and punished. All Bacchic shrines in Italy, 
with the exception of altars and idols, were destroyed (Turcan, 1997).
 Was the fluid nature of Bacchus and the cult the source of anxiety? Gruen 
(1990) noted that the Bacchic cult was beyond governmental control, and Livy 
used the word coniuratio which implies “subversion.” Despite its long-standing 
presence in Italy, the cult is described as having “alien rites” (Gruen, 1990, p. 48), 
and in plays of Plautus those who belong to the cult as seen as violent revelers who 
are irrational. Of particular note is a quote from his play, The Bacchides that hints 
at the fluid aspects of the cult: “… sorores, quae hominum sorbent sanguinem” 
(Gruen, 1990, p. 50). These, “sisters, who suck the blood of men” are female Bac-
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chantes, and perhaps this quote indicates the existential terror the cult inspired in 
the (supposedly) rational patriarchy of Rome.
 The association between women’s particular connection to fluids, and thus 
creaturely aspects of nature, has repercussions in contemporary times. Roberts 
and colleagues (2002) measured how reminders of menstruation can lead to more 
negative reactions to women and increased objectification. In this study, a female 
member of the study team “accidentally” dropped either a tampon or hair clip out 
in front of participants, who were unaware that this occurrence was part of the 
research. When asked to evaluate her after the (fake part of) study, the results were 
disheartening. Dropping the tampon led to: lower evaluations of her competence, 
decreased liking for her, a tendency to avoid sitting near her, and increased ob-
jectification of women in general. Such findings align with what we know about 
aspects of sexism and misogyny: “Because of menstruation, pregnancy, and lacta-
tion, women are perceived as more closely tied to nature, and, at least in Western 
culture, this perception has been used to distinguish them from men, and ultimately 
to devalue them” (Roberts et al., 2002, p. 131). In order for these humans who 
lactate and have menstrual blood to become less of an existential threat (i.e., lessen 
their reminders of our creatureliness), their bodily fluids must be hidden and their 
bodies made into objects more so than creatures of nature. This objectification (in 
a very particular sense) explains why voluptuous near-bare breasts are considered 
(by many-but-not-all) to be acceptable for a store window advertisement, and yet 
a woman nursing a child with an exposed nipple might be (illogically) deemed to 
be indecent (Ussher, 1989; Yalom, 1997). Our fluids remind us that we are finite 
creatures subject to death.
 Fluids seem integral to our perception of bodies, otherwise we are “just skin 
and bones,” and perhaps it is our reaction to those fluids that produce the most 
heightened affective and emotional responses—a corpse, after all, elicits a response 
different from a dry skeleton. Similar to how, because of their connection to fluids, 
some Romans responded to the followers of Dionysos, as well as how contemporary 
societies continue to treat women in harmful ways, we can fervently react to affects 
of zombies. Ndalianis (2012) embodies this affect when she contrasts how the dead 
bodies of vampires and zombies function differently as potential sexual partners. 
Vampire lovers are seductive, but if one were to rewrite a similar sex scene with 
a zombie, the affect would evoke disgust and revulsion—the congealing blood as 
the rotting flesh is peeled away, the smell and ooze of decomposition as it mingles 
with saliva and sweat:
Her nails dug into his shoulders, and she felt the flesh give way, her fingers 
plunging inwards. She felt her fingertips touch a squishy, sticky substance and 
the first thing she notices when she pulled her hands away was the rancid, nause-
ating stench. Peering over her shoulder she gazed at her nails, which had pulled 
out with them bits of torn, rotting flesh, and her fingers dripped with an oozing, 
green substance… (p. 95)
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This scene, had it been with a vampire would still be risqué in its bodily fluid ex-
change (e.g., blood as well as perhaps semen and vaginal fluid), but not to the same 
extent. Although eroticism breaks taboos, it clearly lies in the domain of (living) 
human bodies (Bataille, 1986). Vampires walk a:
fine line between life and death, but this teasing ultimately favors erotic life and 
undying passion. The zombie, on the other hand, steps firmly into the realm of 
death and, through the carnal presence of its animated and putrefying corpse, is 
a reminder to the living (both diegetic and beyond the diegesis) of what awaits 
them when life comes to an end. (Ndalianis, 2012, p. 97)
Although any fluid can remind us of our mortality, not every fluid does this to the 
same extent. The average person does not seem terribly affected by blood from a 
paper cut (although it is indeed unpleasant), and yet, returning to the menstruation 
example, menstrual blood elicits a strong response. Vampires, although sexual 
creatures, walk the line of what might be acceptable more delicately than zombies. 
Zombies ooze a variety of fluids in uncontrolled ways, while vampires’ bodies re-
main more intact. Perhaps a comparison can be made to women’s breasts. Cleavage 
is just sexual enough—teasing us about our potentially wild, sexual nature—while 
many consider nipples and areole to be too far. Vampires tease us with death while 
zombies slap us in the face with it. Particular fluids in situations where they are 
more untamed can be potent reminders of death, and zombie corpses tend to have 
these oozing liquids in abundance.
 Considering the examples in this section—Bacchantes, women, and zombies—
how might we engage with fluids like semen, blood, and breastmilk in ways that 
affirm life instead of denying death? We are arguing here in this paper that corpses 
provide a literal and figurative site for such educational endeavors. Returning to the 
ideas from Edwards (2018) at the beginning of our article, we see (and feel) corpses 
as an opportunity to trouble the liberal humanist subject of life “as an exceptional 
entity who exists apart from a world of animals and things and whose fate can be 
directed by the rationalist will” (p. 5). 
 As revolting and disgusting as most accounts are of seeing, smelling, and 
sensing a decomposing corpse and its fluids, even the affects of a corpse’s fluids 
are not neat and clean guarantees of disgust. Doughty (2014) draws upon her years 
of experience as a mortician to explain to lay readers the curriculum of mortuary 
science and mortuary work. The scent of a decomposing corpse, in her words, is a 
complex one: 
[T]he first note of a putrefying human body is of licorice with a strong citrus un-
dertone. Not a fresh, summer citrus, mind you — more like a can of orange-scented 
industrial bathroom spray shot directly up your nose. Add to that a day-old glass of 
white wine that has begun to attract flies. Top it off with a bucket of fish left in the 
sun. That [...] is what human decomposition smells like. (Doughty, 2014, p. 158) 
Whereas disgust is one curricular mode activated when encountering a corpse, 
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another curricular mode of the corpse relates to how humans subvert a propensity 
to deny their finite creatureliness.
Corporeality and Mortality as a Curriculum of Denial
 Humans (and perhaps other animals) are blessed and cursed with the knowledge 
of our finite bodily existence, and reminders of our limitedness (e.g., the sight of 
our bodily fluids outside our bodies) trigger our sense of creatureliness. We can 
project ourselves forward in time and anticipate our death occurring in a myriad 
of ways—all of which seems horrific to us. Such a situation provides us with an 
opportunity to consider what, then, comprises a good life, and thus “the fact that 
we die is the most important fact about us” (May, 2009, p. 4). Yet, many humans 
choose instead to deny their mortality, which exacts a toll on their relations with 
others as well as the planet because humans “use one another to assure their personal 
victory over death” (Becker, 1975, p. 108).
 According to Becker (1973), “[m]an” is “out of nature and hopelessly in it… 
he [sic] sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he goes back into the 
ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to rot and disappear forever” (p. 
26). Philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal identified the paradox that the 
more humans come to learn, the more we realize our insignificance—a situation 
which calls for “species-level humility” (Thacker, 2015a, p. 165). In many ways, 
humans are like our fellow animals on this planet. We eat, digest, and defecate. 
We feel urges and produce sexual fluids, and some of us procreate. And then we 
die. As far as the planet is concerned, each individual’s existence matters not: The 
planet does not care whether we are here or not (Thacker, 2011).
 This situation, however, has not prevented some humans from exacting extraor-
dinary damage on the planet—climate catastrophe is unfolding, in part, because 
many assume that the world is for humans, rather than us simply being one species 
of many on a planet that is ontologically intact with or without us. Scholars from 
diverging perspectives and disciplines have noted the need for many-but-not-all 
humans to rethink their arrogance; for example, in relation to climate catastrophe. 
Heather Davis and Zoe Todd (2017) have linked the concept of the Anthropocene 
to colonialism rather than a time when humans began to use technology to damage 
the planet in exacerbated ways. Drawing from their own experiences as well as 
the work of Indigenous scholars, they reveal that: “the ecocidal logics that now 
govern our world are not inevitable or ‘human nature’, but are the result of a series 
of decisions that have their origins and reverberations in colonization” (p. 763). 
The dangerous species arrogance of many-but-not-all humans continues to have 
profound aspects on the planet, our societies, and even our personal lives. This 
exemplifies the necrocene—an era of death and destruction of lives, cultures, and 
ways of existing. McBrien (2016) calls for humans to find ways of doing better as 
individuals and communities. Humility is necessary for this task and the grounding 
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effects (literally and figuratively) of the corpse can position persons to engage in 
this task. 
 Humans could be humbled by our (lack of) status, as illustrated by how Sheldon 
Solomon introduces himself: “a twitching blob of respiring biological protoplasm 
no more fundamentally significant or enduring than a lizard or a potato” (Reynolds, 
2014) or by more ethical relations between and among the humans of the past, 
present, and future, as well as our other-than-human kin (Donald, 2009; Tallbear, 
2016); but, unfortunately, many humans tend to do quite the opposite. We deny our 
limitedness and connectedness. As hard as we fight to claim “a towering majesty” 
(often to the detriment of others), at the end of our lives our bodies turn into corpses 
and return us to nature, and we do not take kindly to this knowledge, despite the 
opportunity to embrace a sort of bodily humility.
 Instead of accepting our finite creatureliness, we can deny it. We try to devise 
ways of “transcending the world of flesh and blood… by devising an ‘invisible 
project’ that would assure [our] immortality” (Becker, 1975, p. 63). We cultivate a 
variety of personal immortality projects to leave an enduring imprint on the world 
(e.g., having children, building monuments, accumulating academic citations), as 
well as grounding ourselves in powers borrowed from those beyond us: parents, 
social groups, societies, and nations. Our cultural worldview, for example, tells us 
what came before us, why things are the way they are, and what will endure after 
us. But the price for this reassurance is steep. 
 The problem with adhering to cultural worldviews and nations as an antidote 
for terror is that all worldviews are to some extent arbitrary, fictional assemblages 
about the nature of reality, and thus require continual validation from others in order 
to remain believable. Exposure to cultures of people with alternate worldviews, 
especially those that are opposed to one’s own, therefore, potentially undermines 
one’s faith in the dominant worldview and the psychological protection it provides. 
When our buffer against our impermanence is removed, we can react in harmful 
ways. To illustrate, Harrington (1969) puts it this way:
Cruelty can arise from the aesthetic outrage we sometimes feel in the presence of 
strange individuals who seem to be making out all right... Have they found some 
secret passage to eternal life? It can’t be. If those weird individuals with beards and 
funny hats are acceptable, then what about my claim to superiority? Can someone 
like that be my equal in God’s eyes? Does he, that one, dare hope to live forever 
too—and perhaps crowd me out? I don’t like it. All I know is, if he’s right I’m 
wrong. So different and funny-looking. I think he’s trying to fool the gods with 
his sly ways. Let’s show him up. He’s not very strong. For a start, see what he’ll 
do when I poke him. (pp. 125-126)
If groups of people with opposing beliefs can be injured or killed, the implication is 
that their beliefs are truly inferior to our own. Further to this point, by eliminating 
large numbers of people with a different version of reality, the threatening world-
view may cease to exist, and thus no longer pose a threat (e.g., Hirschberger et al., 
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2016; Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Schimel et al., 2007). Some of the most horrific 
human behaviors throughout history, namely war and genocide, are examples of 
annihilation as a form of worldview defense. As Baldwin (1962) aptly noted: 
Perhaps the whole root of our trouble, the human trouble, is that we will sacrifice 
all the beauty of our lives, will imprison ourselves in totems, taboos, crosses, 
blood sacrifices, steeples, mosques, races, armies, flags, nations, in order to deny 
the fact of death, which is the only fact we have. (para. 50)
We may harm (directly or indirectly) others during our quest for immortality. In the 
case of nationhood, we cling to our nation and thus are prone to shunning or even 
hurting those who construct reality differently. When dominant groups marginalize 
other groups, the stage is set for political underrepresentation (after all, those “weird 
individuals” have nothing to offer “us”) as well as oppression—the subjugation of 
the abject other. According to Becker (1975) we can affirm our symbolic immortal-
ity by taking the lives of others. In this way, our corporeality is denied, in part, by 
enhancing the bodily creatureliness and thus mortality of others. Mbembe (2005) 
noted “the life in death” and that “the taking of the enemy’s life is the privileged 
dialect of history” (p. 18). Through the idea of necropolitics, Mbembe (2003) shifted 
Foucault’s idea of biopower, specifically focusing on who is allowed to live, and 
who is left to die or killed: “the generalized instrumentalization of human existence 
and the material destruction of human bodies and populations” (p. 14). As such, 
mortality is “decoupled from the project of living—a direct relation to killing that 
renders impossible any subterfuge in a hallucinating disavowal of death in moder-
nity” (Puar, 2007, p. 33). Mbembe flipped Foucault: Instead of death as affirming 
vitality, for Mbembe, death (especially death on a massive scale as in massacres) 
is evidence for “the brutality of biopower’s incitement to life” (Puar, 2007, p. 33).
 Perhaps this turn of phrase seems to the reader to be inconsequential at first, 
and yet it more aptly explains how the death of one’s socio-political enemy can 
become the primary objective. If Power ignores death, then it makes little sense to 
focus on murder. Instead, it is Power that embraces the death of others—whoever 
is deemed to be “not us.” Necropolitics plays upon our existential fears. Those who 
threaten our nation (or other immortality projects) are evils that must be eradicated. 
Our heroic quest, then, is to annihilate it. One’s own group is “pure and good” and 
others “are the real animals, are spoiling everything for you, contaminating your 
purity and bringing disease and weakness into your vitality” (Becker, 1975, p. 93). 
Not only can lives be considered disposable, as we see in the context of precarity 
and biopolitics (such as Black, Brown, and Indigenous lives in Canada and the US), 
but also certain lives are seen as sacrificial in the name of immunizing the lives 
of those deemed good. The use of necropolitics, for example by governments, can 
manipulate and control people using “the language of survival” to gain support for 
physically harming or killing others, such as during the War on Terror (Braidotti, 
2013, p. 122). Not only are those deaths acceptable, but they also serve a suppos-
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edly positive function of protecting the rest of ‘us’ from harm. Such adherence to 
nations as immortality projects has led to bloody wars and much human suffering. 
Humans, when we are overcompensating for our mortality, can become intensely 
destructive:
The thing that makes man the most devastating animal that ever stuck his neck 
up into the sky is that he wants an earth that is not an earth but a heaven, and the 
price for this kind of fantastic ambition is to make the earth an even more eager 
graveyard than it naturally is. (Becker, 1975, p. 96)
If, as humans, we hope to accept our mortality and stop futile quests for immor-
tality at the expense of others, then engagements with our fluid nature could be a 
powerful curricular mode.
Corporeality and Mortality
as a Curriculum of Dis- and Re-membering
 We can turn to a more hermeneutic orientation of curriculum that considers what 
it means for the living to see another human as a member of the dead, to engage in 
practices of dis-membering and re-membering that build upon the affects and feelings 
created in the aftermath of denial for more affirming affective relations to mortality. 
Semantically, dismembering conjures images and associations with a destructive and 
violent inflection commonly encountered during scenes of instruction in a history 
course: cutting off a gangrenous arm in a U.S. Civil War medic camp; decapitation 
of an aristocrat at the guillotine in France; a market vendor’s leg blown off during a 
suicide bombing in Afghanistan. Here, though, we consider dismemberment differently 
in thinking of funerary and mortuary practices that, through specific rituals, partition 
the corpse from living bodies and remove a dead body as member of a community of 
living bodies, to literally dis-member from the living. Similarly, we use remembering 
to refer to practices that allow a living body to recollect, recall, or reinstate a dead 
body as a member of a living body’s community, practices by which the living to 
commune with the dead, to rejoin the fold. 
 Alaimo (2010) reorients our thinking about what it means to remember in a 
conventional sense, to recollect a thought or experience, by shifting the grounds 
of our subjectivity through how we think of our selves as members within a living 
collective, a “material world that is never merely an external place but always the 
very substance of ourselves and others” (p. 158). Whereas the previous two sections 
on disgust and denial use examples to break down humanist assumptions of the 
bodily and the creaturely, this section remains within this more-than-human realm 
of life and death to consider different objects that dis-member the human and, in 
turn, re-member them through different funerary and memorial practices. 
 There has been a rise in the number of green or ecofriendly funerals in the 
United States, in which companies process a corpse and mix the human remains 
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with straw and wood chips to place in the ground as a compost to help grow plants 
and flowers (Boylan, 2019). When actor Luke Perry died in 2019, he was buried in 
a mushroom suit, which is a biodegradable suit that interacts with the decomposi-
tion of his corpse to turn his remains into nutrients that re-enter the ground (Pesce, 
2019). These and related trends in mortuary practices (at least within the United 
States) point to changing attitudes and relationships the living have with corpses 
that strive to re-orient our relationship to the deceased vis-à-vis our understand-
ing and appreciation for what corpses do in efforts to ‘make sense’ of death and 
bring the irrationality and terror of death to a scientific, sensible, worldview. This 
approach to dis-memberment compels the living person to think about the corpse 
through processes of dis-memberment and the various ways one dis-members a 
corpse: through a burial at sea, a cremation, a dissolution in a bath of sulfuric acid, 
or mass burial in a grave or pit.  
 We can also see the corpse functioning as a curricular mode of re-membrance 
in some of the memorial practices of death in Japan. Families take the bodies of 
deceased family members away from hospital morgues and into their homes for an 
overnight wake that lasts through the following morning upon which the corpse is 
taken to a crematorium for remains to be cremated (Rich, 2017). As the population 
of elderly persons approaching death reaches higher and higher numbers in Japan, 
the country’s crematoria cannot rapidly process all of the corpses in need of cre-
mation. As a result, itai hoteru, or “corpse hotels” in English, are spreading across 
Japan as a service in which families can spend the night in rooms with their family 
member’s corpse to properly practice mourning rites while the corpse then goes 
back into storage for a later cremation (Blakemore, 2017). In these corpse hotels, 
the corpse becomes a companion and a centerpiece. Spending the night with the 
dead takes on a literal dimension in this sense as the living dis-members the once 
living, by placing them in objects of death, such as a casket or coffin, and then 
re-members the corpse, breaking it away from daily actions with the corpse as it 
‘rests’ or ‘remains’ in a ‘final’ place, thus allowing for the human to be in contact 
with these objects as conduits for remembering and recalling memories of the de-
ceased as once living. We find the ease and acceptance of “living with the dead” (if 
only for a night and a long morning) illustrative of the broader sets of affects and 
practices that attend to rituals of wakes, viewings, and other ceremonies in which 
we the living are not traumatized or in refusal of being in contact with the dead. 
The corpse functions in this instance not as a subject of denial, but as an object of 
celebration through both dis-membering and re-membering. 
 This celebration with the dead is not unique to Japanese corpse hotels. In 
wakes, people gather to socialize and celebrate a deceased person, with the his-
torical antecedent that mourners would stay awake with the dead until it was time 
to bury the corpse, keeping a watch or vigil over the corpse in the home. Wakes, 
viewings, funerals, and other mourning rituals may be seen as elaborate rituals for 
the relatively simple process of chucking and discarding the remains of deceased 
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persons, the very literal issue at heart of this journal’s special issue. But to commune 
with the dead requires positioning the corpse as an object of celebration, commem-
oration, and reflection. In the United States, end-of-life ceremonies are changing 
to become more convivial and less somber affairs, channeling grief into different 
affective states in which the affective power of a corpse to move us is routed into 
parties, celebrations, and other festive occasions (Heller, 2019). All of this may seem 
infelicitous for opening new modes of thinking about mortality and corporeality in 
curriculum thought, but the process of dis-membering and re-membering radically 
shift what can be possible for reflection, a concept we find too grossly clichéd and 
drained of vitality within educational and curricular practice. 
 If we take communing with the dead to mean the process of feeling in close 
spiritual contact in one’s thoughts and feelings with someone deceased, we often 
think of paranormal and supernatural scenarios such as seances, psychic medium 
readings, or the use of Ouija boards to allow the living to re-member the deceased 
into their community of living bodies. Yet, if we look back at the medieval history 
of Europe, we would see that communing with the dead occurred outside of these 
paranormal settings and involved both secular and sacred practices, practices that 
appear to us in the twenty-first century as more akin to the celebratory nature funeral 
services have adopted in recent years. For example, Rollo-Koster (2017) contends 
that after one-third of Europe’s population died during the Black Death in the 
fourteenth century, attitudes towards death became more dispassionate, quotidian, 
and less fearful. Because corpses were, quite literally, everywhere, burying the 
dead was a growing and increasingly important industry, intertwined with people 
wishing to be buried close to saints. Pits were dug in the courtyards of churches, 
tombs were carved out below churches, and some bodies were even buried within 
church walls or placed in ornate cadaver tombs that feature effigies of the deceased 
as a skeleton or a decomposing corpse.
 According to Ariès (1977/1981), in his history of how Europeans have ap-
proached death, people danced and partied in cemeteries, often taking walks through 
the graveyards of churches, for “the dead completely ceased to inspire fear” after 
“a lessening of the aversion that the dead inspired” (p. 36). This orientation to how 
we bring complacency and calm when surrounded by corpses (which emitted foul 
odors inside the unrefrigerated churches) shows how a physical re-membering 
alongside and with the dead reroutes affects of disgust and denial in the presence 
of posthuman, living-dead assemblages amongst bodies and earth. 
Corporeality and Mortality as a Curriculum of Disruption
 We believe humans have very little incentive to consider the pedagogical as-
pects of corpses—and even are psychologically discouraged from doing so. Yet, the 
disruptive potentialities arising from these corpse encounters are many. The places 
where we encounter corporeality and mortality help us in asking Wallin’s question 
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of how a life might go because they render visible some discomforting lessons about 
humans’ mortality that disrupt our humanist sensibilities. Encountering a dead body 
often triggers uncomfortable and difficult knowledge(s), disruptive moments of 
learning in which the corpse becomes a curricular text producing “both cognitive 
and affective responses of discomfort and unease” (Sandlin & Letts, 2014, p. 1).
 In Philadelphia’s Mütter Museum of medical history, human anatomical anom-
alies are displayed for visitors in jars, glasses, cases, and through other technologies 
of representation. The cadaverous collection of infantile corpses, mummified heads, 
and preserved organs are meant to educate and enlighten, as evidenced in the mu-
seum’s tag line of enabling visitors to become ‘disturbingly informed’ (Aptowicz, 
2014). Although the Mütter Museum focuses on representations of medical history 
from the 19th century amidst a Victorian and Edwardian aesthetic, it is similar 
to museums such as the anatomy and pathology collections in the United States 
Defense Health Agency’s National Museum of Health and Medicine; the skinned 
cadavers in France’s Musée Fragonard; and almost a thousand embalmed body 
parts at the Museum Boerhaave in the Netherlands (Cichanowicz, 2016).
 More contemporarily, Lee (2014) reminds us of the disorienting and disruptive 
effects of the once massively popular Body Worlds exhibitions that traveled on 
display around the world. These anatomical displays allowed visitors in science 
museums and other places of learning “to view plastinated cadavers, posed in 
striking arrangements of partial dissection and intactness” (p. 5).  The disruptive 
effects of the corpses on display in the Body World exhibits implicate the living 
viewer to consider “violating notions of the human” such as in how one “flayed 
specimen’s holding his “coat” of skin in his hand—and their flagrant use of human 
tissues” disrupts the living’s comfortable sense of embodiedness (Lee, 2014, p. 
5). This disruption is disclosed to the living viewer through “a speculated relation 
between the carved-up tissues and a certain life narrative” (Lee, 2014, p. 5). By 
collecting, curating, and exhibiting anatomical oddities, deformities, pathologies, 
and specimens drawn from a multitude of corpses, these museums mean to educate 
through affects of disruption in what could be argued as a morbid and macabre 
curriculum of mortality and corporeality.
 This disruption is akin to what Domanska (2005) sees as a frequent “exhumation 
process” of our engagement with the dead in how our “treatment of dead bodies as 
evidence introduces radical distance” between us, the living, as “subject” and the 
corpse as an “object of analysis” working to force us in curriculum, as both students 
and teachers, to consider “scientistic patterns of discourse about scientific truth, 
objectivity… and the dead body’s helplessness to resist the violence of a variety of 
discourses” (p. 403). Foucault (1963/1973) links different historical moments in the 
Enlightenment to show how corpses, often operating as medical cadavers, functioned 
as eminent sites of learning for scientists as well as sites of disciplining the medical 
gaze of physicians. In this genealogy of medical knowledge, Foucault points out 
the way corpses work as a kind of curriculum text, in which the corpse disrupted 
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scientific and medical knowledge to work through the emergence of new knowledge 
of the body and its mysteries. Working to disrupt prior regimes of knowledge, “the 
corpse became the brightest moment in the figures of truth” through studying corpses 
“where once larva was formed” (Foucault, 1963/1973, p. 125).
 Foucault’s historical scene of the corpse and Enlightenment knowledge tracks 
with how literature, art, and popular culture portray Enlightenment-era Europe as 
full of zealous physicians, mad scientists, curious surgeons, robbing graves and ex-
perimenting on corpses in the vein of Dr. Frankenstein, all in the name of disrupting 
what humans believed about the body and its capacities. These capacities are also at 
work in what Shapira (2018) notes in a detailed study of how disruptive encounters 
with human remains and corpses worked to “thrill” readers, scientists, and the public 
in eighteenth-century Europe, whether the corpse is “riddled with worms or idealized 
into an object of ethereal beauty” (p. 6). An effect of the Scientific Revolution and 
Enlightenment has been to discipline and control the disruptive effects of the corpse 
and the living’s encounters with human remains, whether they be in the form of 
putrefying flesh of bodies rotting in a cobblestone street, or the limp bodies hanging 
from gibbets in a town square, or the pockmarked and blackened skin of bodies that 
succumbed to sickness, disease, malnourishment, famine, and lack of sanitation. 
 This approach to the corpse as a disruptive site of knowledge and awareness 
for the living exists today in the form of body farms. In 2019 the United Kingdom 
opened its first body farm, also known as a forensic cemetery or taphonomy facility, 
which allows researchers to place corpses in open-air settings, shallow graves, and 
floating pools to better observe and study processes of decomposition, skeletonization, 
and fossilization (Adam, 2019). In the United States, the Forensic Anthropology 
Center at the University of Tennessee Knoxville opened in 1980 and continues to 
use donated corpses and human remains in the training of forensic anthropology 
and skeletal biology (Fitter, 2019). In these spaces, the bodily materiality of the 
corpse enlightens us and educates us through knowledge of what happens to bodies 
after death. Considering this function of a corpse calls our attention to the many 
things the living do with corpses: we dig graves and bury bodies, but also exhume 
corpses when digging them up to study them; we dissect and inspect bodies through 
autopsies and coroner reports; we experiment, embalm, and cremate corpses; and 
we store corpses, sometimes for scientific and legal purposes, such as in laboratories 
and morgues, and other times for purposes of sacred ritual and remembrance, such 
as in charnel houses, crypts, and mausoleums.
 When the corpse is used to educate and enlighten, it enacts what Frieze (2019) 
identifies as an animating concern of a “forensic turn” in the humanities and social 
sciences, a turn focused on discovering, identifying, and presenting evidence in an 
objective, methodological way to unlock a secret or yield information, like the cal-
culated and rational endeavors of a detective such as Sherlock Holmes or a forensic 
investigator on Bones or CSI. According to Frieze (2019), “death is no barrier to the 
flow of information that is the lifeblood of the forensic; and, in forensic culture, in-
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formation seems not only to cheat but to exert death” (emphasis his; p. 31). A critical 
corpse studies would ask where and how the corpse has been used to disrupt received 
wisdom of being human via a curriculum of corporeality and mortality.  
 As social studies educators, we both have encountered the corpse in our 
teaching and our curricula as a disruptive object of instruction and explication. 
In our history classes, for example, corpses appear in lessons on the guillotine in 
the French Revolution; sacrifice in Mayan and Aztec civilizations; starvation as a 
result of colonialism in nineteenth-century Ireland; the path of the plague during 
the Black Death; the emaciated bodies in the concentration camps of the Holo-
caust; the genocide of peoples in the various slave trades around the world; the 
high death toll of World War II and the obliterated bodies of victims of the atomic 
bomb’s destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to name only a few of the more 
gruesome and perennial topics in the social studies curriculum. These are perhaps 
disciplinary ways a corpse disrupts historical knowledge, but we wish to briefly 
discuss less intuitive ways that corpses disrupt our knowledge, in a subtle fashion, 
through routes in the history curriculum that produce affective responses different 
from disgust and denial found in the previous examples. 
 Our example is in teaching about ancient Egypt. In looking back at my teach-
ing, I (Mark) recalled how prominent mummification was in my history curriculum 
as a cipher for understanding complex beliefs, values, and histories entwined in 
ancient Egyptian art, literature, and culture. When I have taught middle-grade 
students about the process of how Egyptians mummified bodies, I would lead 
students through a process of mummifying apples with salt and baking soda. The 
objective of the lesson was less on teaching the natural processes of decomposi-
tion that leads to the skeletonization and disintegration of bodies, but rather on 
the processes of how Egyptians worshipped, commemorated, and celebrated the 
dead, with ornamental sarcophagi and jewelry; canopic jars that stored a body’s 
viscera and organs; hieroglyphic inscriptions in funerary tombs; and mythological 
sources for ancient Egyptian beliefs in the afterlife. And yet the affective power of 
mummifying apples with my students was not in the aesthetic choices we made to 
adorn our mummies; rather, it occurred in our comprehension and observation of 
the decomposition of the apple itself. We watched it shrivel up, wrinkle, putrefy, 
and become, by all outward appearances, “dead,” an apple corpse. 
 Later, when my students and I would travel to a local history museum in our 
city to view an ancient Egyptian mummy exhibited in a display of the museum 
founder’s (politically and ethically questionable) trips to Egypt in the 1920s to 
collect ancient artifacts, we would think about our apples as we gazed at the body 
in the enclosed glass display. That gaze becomes a mechanism through which our 
engagement with corpses so often transpires as an educative act. Life, in these 
instances of gazing, is disrupted with thinking about the dead and “make of death 
an object of affirmation and joy, rather than one of fear, sorrow, and negation…as 
the absolute possible of our being” (Locke, 2016, p. 23). 
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 The mummified corpse functioned for me and my students as an object lesson 
in death and in considering the very concept of ancient Egypt as weird and eerie, 
feelings that disrupted what we take for granted not only about being alive, but in 
the ways of becoming-corpse in our modern era that make ancient Egyptian mor-
tuary practices feel so alien and unsettling. Fisher (2016) approaches the eerie as 
when something is absent or unaccounted for and we cannot explain or know why, 
a disruptive sense of absence through dread, and the weird as that which arrests our 
attention because it makes us confront something we see that feels out of place, 
threatening, disorienting, or inexplicable, a disruptive sense of presence through 
dread. The mummy’s corpse and its items in the glass display case made ancient 
Egypt weird for me and my students because seeing clay jars containing body organs 
and large metal hooks utilized to remove brain tissue through the corpse’s nose are 
disorienting, a disturbing presence that makes us think “it should not exist” through 
“a sensation of wrongness” (Fisher, 2016, p. 15). It is not that this preserved corpse 
and the jars for its organs and the tools for its dismemberment and preservation 
are inherently wrong, invalid, or illogical; rather, the affects of the weird are that 
we are seeing these things in a space where we often do not or feel we should not 
gaze upon them—a museum, a place of learning and ‘appropriate’ things, as is our 
relation to schools.
 These disruptive affects may amount to what Thacker (2015b) calls “the limit 
of thought, human characters confronted with the limit of the human” that unsettles 
our foundations for making sense of being in a human-centric world (p. 11). This 
unease corresponds to what Kristeva (1980/1982) theorizes about the abjection 
we find in corpses. The insistent materiality of death, for Kristeva, disrupts us 
when we see a corpse, especially a corpse of someone we know or love, because it 
makes confronting our own mortality more real and visceral. The disruption from 
a corpse is an instance of “death infecting life” as the corpse draws our desire to 
the compulsion of facing up to death through the abjection of the corpse (Kristeva, 
1980/1982, p. 4). We can endeavor across our disciplinary fields to work towards 
a spirit of curriculum that approaches corporeality and morality for this purpose, 
tracing disruptive moments when death infects life and unsettles us. 
A Final Rest: Concluding Thoughts
 Our forays into a critical corpse studies have illustrated how the corpse activates 
curricular modes of disgust, denial, dis-/re-memberment, and disruption. Animated 
by our realization that certain bodies are privileged over others in curriculum, we 
have found thinking with and through the corpse informative insofar as it opens 
up new possibilities for thinking about relations between life/death, the living/
the dead, the corporeal/incorporeal, and the human/nonhuman. The fluids in our 
bodies remind us of our status as creatures, and if we can overcome our denial 
of death and our associated creatureliness, we might engage in a different ethics. 
Mark Helmsing & Cathryn van Kessel 159
Despite the topic being one of corpses and death, we find this area of inquiry to be 
hopeful: “To be a creature is to accept our dependence and limitedness in a way 
that does not result in disaffection and despair. It is rather the condition for courage 
and endurance” (Critchley, 2009, p. 248-249). This hope is not about a command 
to be happy and deny the troubling times within which we find ourselves. Rather, 
this hope is radical in the sense of Lear (2006)—a hope that taps into our shared 
vulnerability in precarious times.
 What can educators and curricularists try to do to achieve a radically hopeful 
way of being that becomes more attentive through disgust, denial, dis-memberment, 
and disruption? First, in order to pluck up the intestinal fortitude required to face 
our mortality, we need conceptual tools. Without such tools, the potentialities of 
educational engagements with corporeal curriculum are limited. As discussed in 
this article, these educational engagements with mortality can help us live. Perhaps 
we might treat our finite lives as May (2009) suggests—like we would an antique 
watch. He doesn’t want us to keep it in a museum or locked away at home so that 
we cannot really engage with it, but neither does he want us to treat the watch in 
a cavalier way. Instead, we might be “careful: not neurotically careful, but careful 
in the way of enjoying it without abusing it” (p. 86). Through a consideration of 
corpses, we might disrupt our patterns of denial and instead embrace our status as 
interconnected creatures living among others on the planet. At the very least, we 
must acknowledge that in educative spaces ignoring and denying death simply will 
not do and is educative malpractice.
 Secondly, we can implicate ourselves in a pedagogy and curriculum that pur-
sues lessons in which a human becoming a corpse is not an end to a body’s agency 
in the world, and, as such, exists as an educational site. In particular, experiences 
with corpses and their fluids have a curricular potential not only to teach us about 
our resistance to the idea of death but also to help us resist overly rational, disem-
bodied, and narrowly-focused learning outcomes. Corpses are not the waste of a 
living body, and rejecting their power does us a disservice. The fact that a corpse 
is an assemblage of tissues, viscera, bacteria, fluids, odors, and always in flux 
molecularly render the corpse a dynamic curricular vessel.
 Whether we teach literally with corpses, as perhaps common in a biology or 
anatomy course, or figurative, as perhaps in a literature or history course, we can 
resist any arresting nature of thought through the corpse’s decomposition, its array 
of cultural, historical, biological, chemical, and political meaning(s) that always 
gesture and refer to something else: a Great Beyond, an afterlife, a pine box, a 
memorial shrine, a crematorium, a hole in the ground six feet under, ashes spread 
in the wind, a body rotting into the soil, a DNA sample, a dental record, something 
that is no longer with ‘us’ the living.  Through a recognition of these and other 
examples of a corpse’s place in the word we are forced to consider what we have 
neglected, and thus opens up the space to imagine more meaningful educational 
encounters in schools and beyond.
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